We study policies that regulate executive compensation in a model that jointly determines executives' e¤ort, compensation and …rm leverage. The market failure that justi…es regulation is that executives are optimistic about asset prices in states of distress. We show that shareholders propose compensation packages that lead to socially excessive leverage. Say-on-pay regulation does not reduce the incentives for leverage. Regulating the structure of compensation (but not its level) with a cap on the ratio of variable-to…xed pay delivers the right leverage. However, it is more e¢cient to directly regulate leverage because restricting the variable compensation impacts managerial e¤ort more than if shareholders are free to design compensation subject to a leverage constraint.
Introduction
Following the 2007-09 …nancial crisis, there has been a lively debate in the academic and policy circles about regulating executive compensation to avoid excessive …rms' leverage. Some countries have regulated the structure or the level of compensation, especially for …nancial …rms, while others have adopted say-on-pay regimes that increase shareholder's weight in the design of executive compensation. For example, the European Union (Directive 2013/36/EU and CRD4) has established that bonuses at credit institutions and investment …rms cannot exceed 100% of …xed salary (200% if the company wins shareholder approval). The U.S. is also discussing new rules to curb executive compensation in …nancial institutions (Wall Street Journal 2016) . Correa and Lel (2016) document that eleven countries have passed laws to give shareholders direct in ‡uence on executive compensation policies (i.e., say on pay laws).
In this paper we analyze policies that regulate executive compensation in a model that is new because it jointly determines leverage, compensation and executives' e¤ort. This e¤ort a¤ects the likelihood of a crisis. The model yields three main insights. First, we show that, when the CEO is optimistic about asset prices in states of distress, shareholders prefer compensation contracts that induce socially ine¢cient …rms' overleverage. Second, regulating the ratio of variable-to-…xed payments (but not the level of compensation) can deliver socially optimal leverage levels. However, our third result shows that it may be more e¢cient (i.e., less distorting in terms of e¤ort provision) to directly regulate leverage rather than executive compensation.
In our model, a representative price-taker …rm is run by a risk-neutral CEO ("she") who decides the …rm's level of borrowing to …nance an investment with stochastic payo¤s. The model does not distinguish between …nancial and non-…nancial …rms. There are many examples of overborrowing for both …nancial and non-…nancial …rms. For example, Ryou and Kim (2003) describe overborrowing by Korean …rms before the Asian …nancial crisis of the late 1990s. More recent examples include energy companies as Abengoa's debt-fueled expansion (Wall Street Journal 2015 ).
In the model, the CEO provides costly and unobservable e¤ort that determines the likelihood of success of the investment. The …rm's shareholder ("he") o¤ers the CEO a compensation contract that includes, potentially, a …xed salary and a variable, performance-based bonus. Uncertainty is represented by two possible states. In the "low" (distressed) state of nature, the …rm must sell core assets at a discount (i.e., …re sales) to cover debt losses. Following Gabaix (2014) , the CEO overborrows because she underestimates the marginal cost of …re sales in the event of distress. This is what we de…ne as managerial optimism.
The shareholder, even if he correctly estimates the marginal cost of …re sales, prefers not to amend the executive's optimism and tolerates overborrowing because of two reasons. First, higher leverage is motivating the CEO to put more e¤ort making the good state of nature more likely; Second, the optimistic CEO, because she overestimates the …rm's pro…ts, ends up receiving a lower variable bonus than she expected. The shareholder bene…ts from an e¤ort level higher than what he is ultimately paying for.
In the model, like in Krugman (1998) , …re sales are not a mere wealth redistribution but imply real costs for society because in states of distress the assets end up being ine¢ciently managed. 1 These "mismanagement externalities" caused by the …re sales creates a role for policy, even if the key friction is a behavioral one as optimism. The planner could achieve Pareto superior outcomes if it could reduce the market equilibrium level of …re sales. The planner would choose the socially optimal level of …rm's borrowing as a tradeo¤ between the real costs of …re sales versus the gains from the investment …nanced with debt.
We analyze two policy tools to induce social e¢ciency. First, we restrict shareholders'choices on the structure (although not the level) of executive compensation. That is, we impose a cap on the variable relative to the …xed salary. Second, we directly regulate the leverage level, like with standard capital requirements or leverage restrictions. Finally, we compare the two policy tools.
The model shows that regulating the ratio of variable bonus to …xed salary may achieve the socially optimal level of debt. This policy tool reduces the CEO incentives to provide e¤ort (induced by the variable bonus). Thus, the probability of a crisis may be higher, but the losses would be smaller due to smaller leverage.
Regulating compensation may not be the most e¢cient policy to tackle overleverage. It may be more e¢cient to directly restrict leverage as proposed, for example, by Korinek and Jeanne (2014) . The intuition for this result is that restricting variable pay will likely distort e¤ort incentives more than restricting leverage and letting the shareholder choose the compensation contract. Thus, variable pay will be higher under a leverage restriction and so will be managerial e¤ort.
Our paper contributes to several literatures. First, a growing literature has documented that overcon…dence and optimism by …rms' executives leads to overinvestment and overborrowing (for example, Malmendier et al. 2005 , Hackbarth 2009 , Ben-David et al. 2013 , Palmon and Venezia 2013 , or Ho et al. 2016 ). However, this literature has not studied the role of the endogenous CEO's e¤ort. We show two non-trivial channels that make the CEO's e¤ort increasing in optimism. First, there is a complementarity between e¤ort and leverage. Optimism encourages higher leverage, and higher leverage entices higher e¤ort to avoid the larger losses if the low state on nature is realized. This complementarity between debt and e¤ort is new in the literature. Second, as the manager is compensated in equity, the manager has more incentives to put in e¤ort at a more valuable …rm. Thus, more optimism means more e¤ort.
Second, we complement Gervais et al. (2011) who show that shareholders strategically bene…t from managers who overestimate their own skills by "saving" on compensation.
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In our case, executives overestimation is related to asset prices that we model as in Gabaix (2014) . Another novelty of this paper is that CEO's e¤ort is endogenous and interacts with both the choice of debt and the compensation contract proposed by the shareholder. These are key extensions for the results and policies that we study.
Our results complement the recent literature which analyzes executive compensation as 1 Krugman (1998) points to Michael Jackson's purchases of ski resorts during the 1997 Asian Financial crisis and how he mismanaged them. Aguiar and Gopinath (2005) and Acharya et al. (2011) also examine …re sales to ine¢cient investors. a policy tool. For example, John et al. (2000) , Bebchuk and Spamann (2009), Bolton et al. (2015) , Raviv and Sisli-Ciamarra (2013) , Hakenes and Schnabel (2014), or Thanassoulis (2014) . This literature has mostly focused on risk-shifting problems and externalities from competition in labor markets. Gete and Gómez (2015) compare compensation contracts in a model with overborrowing externalities but exogenous e¤ort and exogenous compensation contracts. To our knowledge, this is the …rst paper to compare regulating compensation versus leverage regulations.
Finally, most of our results apply to recent representative agent models of overborrowing with collateral constraints in which the borrower does not internalize the link between her actions and asset prices, like Lorenzoni (2008) , Bianchi (2010) , Korinek (2010), or Stavrakeva (2013) . In those papers the agent does not internalize the right …re sale prices because she is small and ignores general equilibrium e¤ects. In our model, the agent (the CEO) is optimistic. In any case, the agent overborrows because she underestimates the cost of …re sales.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 shows that shareholders propose compensation contracts that generate overleverage. Section 4 studies regulations to achieve social e¢ciency. Section 5 analyzes how our theoretical results may yield di¤erent empirical predictions across sectors. Section 6 concludes. The Appendix contains the algebra.
Model
There is a continuum of small …rms which we model as a representative price-taker …rm. The …rm is composed of an executive (the CEO) and a shareholder. The shareholder owns the …rm but the CEO manages it. Both are risk-neutral. The shareholder only decides the CEO's compensation contract. Besides the …rm, there exists an unskilled investor. Next we discuss the setup and the problem of each agent.
Setup
There is one period and we denote its beginning and end by t 0 and t 1 . At the end of the period there are two states of nature (high and low) that we denote with superscripts, s = fh; lg:
There are two assets: a core asset and a new investment asset. The core asset represents the "steady-state strategy" of the company. It involves relatively low uncertainty. Thus, we model it as a risk-free asset that pays a deterministic gross return b > 0. At t 0 , the …rm is endowed with k units of the core asset. There exists as well a new investment asset that pays a gross return a h if the state of nature is high, and a l if it is low, with
At t 0 , the …rm's CEO can borrow d 0 units at an interest R to invest in the investment asset. This investment asset represents a new, uncertain strategy. By putting some e¤ort e > 0 the CEO a¤ects the likelihood of arriving to the high state-of-nature. That is, the high state occurs with endogenous probability p(e); which is increasing in the e¤ort exerted by the CEO. For example, this e¤ort is the time and resources employed to search for new investment opportunities. E¤ort is not observable by the shareholder and the CEO's compensation cannot be contingent on it. This is the source of agency con ‡ict in our model. 3 We assume that p(e) = e; and solve for the optimal e¤ort directly as a function of p; that is
Providing e¤ort is costly for the CEO with an increasing and convex cost function c (p) : We assume that there is a minimum e¤ort level needed to run the …rm:
with c 0 (p) = 0. This assumption ensures that debt has a positive expected net payo¤ ruling out the trivial case in which d = 0.
At t 0 the shareholder proposes a compensation contract to the CEO. The contract consists of a …xed salary F 0 and a variable payment that is a percentage 2 [0; 1] of the …rm's pro…t at the end of the period. If the CEO accepts the compensation contract, she must decide at t 0 how much e¤ort to exert and how much to borrow. If the CEO rejects the contract her reservation compensation is A.
At time t 1 and state s, the CEO has to repay the debt and interests. If the return on the investment is not enough to repay, the CEO can sell part of the core assets, f s , to the unskilled investor for a price q s . As we show below, the purchase price the unskilled investor pays is below the value of the long-term asset, q s < b; thus we refer to these sales as …re sales.
We denote the …rm's pro…t at t 1 as
We focus on non-default equilibria. That is, equilibria that satisfy the following non-negativity constraint:
In other words, we assume that, after the …re sales, all debt and interests are repaid. As explained below, this non-default constraint will help prevent losses in equilibrium. 3 E¤ort aversion has been studied by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Harris and Raviv (1979) , among many others.
The investor's problem
At t 1 ; the investor can buy some of the core assets from the …rm at price q s per unit. We refer to the investor as "unskilled" because to manage x units of core assets she has to pay a quadratic cost 1 2 vx 2 ; with v 0. The parameter v captures the marginal loss from early liquidation. Like in Krugman (1998) , these costs are real costs which reduce total output; that is, they are not mere transfers across agents. For example, these costs can be inferior management or informational skills of the investor relative to the …rm's CEO. 4 Therefore, selling core assets is negative-NPV.
In equilibrium, by market clearing, the assets bought at t 1 by the unskilled investor equal the assets sold by the …rm's CEO, f s . The unskilled investor maximizes the value she would get from the assets purchased at price q s net of purchase costs. That is,
The …rst-order-condition yields the price function
This is the price at which the investor would buy core assets from the CEO at t 1 : It is decreasing in the volume of purchases because the cost of managing the assets increases in their volume. For positive sales, the price is always below the asset's fundamental value, b, that is, the value if it remains managed by the …rm.
The CEO's problem
Like in Gabaix (2014) , the CEO does not correctly internalize the price function (4). That is, she makes decisions at t 0 assuming
with m 2 (0; 1]: For m < 1 the CEO overvalues the asset prices at which she expects to sell in the low state of nature. Thus, we interpret m as a measure of the CEO's optimism: smaller m would correspond to larger optimism.
Because the CEO would never sell at a negative price, …re sales will be limited to the range
: We assume that, for any m, the parameters satisfy
Assumption (6) together with the non-default constraint (3) prevent the …rm from entering into losses. Allowing …rm losses is equivalent to removing assumptions (3), (6), and introducing restrictions on limited-liability for both the CEO and the shareholder. Payo¤s will then exhibit a "kink." It is well understood that limited liability may induce risk-shifting and overleverage (see, for instance, John et al. 2000) . Our model generates overleverage through a di¤erent channel: managerial optimism.
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At the end of the period, the CEO's expected discounted payments are
where
is the …rm's expected pro…t at t 1 :
The CEO takes as given the …xed and variable payments (F and ) and decides the level of debt and e¤ort to maximize her expected discounted payments net of the e¤ort cost:
subject to (2), (3), the non-negative restrictions on f 
The shareholder's problem
At t 0 , the shareholder proposes a compensation contract (F; ) to maximize the …rm's expected pro…t net of the CEO's compensation. Thus, he solves
(1 )V (p; m) F; subject to F 0, 2 [0; 1], the debt, e¤ort and …re sales which solve the CEO's problem, and to the CEO's participation constraint
3 Ine¢cient market equilibrium
First we identify the socially e¢cient allocations. Then we solve the CEO's problem and characterize the compensation contract proposed by the shareholder. Managerial optimism 5
The non-default constraint (3) and condition (6) prevent the kink. These restrictions together with the assumption of risk neutrality make the model much more tractable and the intuitions more straight forward. On the other side, these assumptions will a¤ect the shareholder's optimal contract choice. We discuss the implications of these assumptions in Section 4. 6 Because of (3), choosing the level of debt is equivalent to selecting the asset sales. As we will show below, it is never optimal to sell core assets in the high state of nature. In the low state the manager sells the core assets needed for (3) to be binding. leads to socially ine¢cient overleverage. When e¤ort is endogenous, leverage is shown to increase further due to the complementarity between CEO choices of leverage and e¤ort. More importantly, the shareholder, even if he is not optimistic, has no incentive to correct the CEO. This result questions the e¢cacy of say-on-pay regulation to prevent excessive …rm leverage.
Social e¢ciency
The social ine¢ciency is due to the resources the unskilled investor wastes when she acquires core assets (v > 0) : Pareto-e¢cient allocations optimize that waste of resources. Optimizing the waste does not eliminate such waste entirely, since such a result is only possible when debt is zero. But zero debt is not optimal since the expected return from debt is positive. The optimal leverage is achieved when the …rm's CEO selects the right level of debt while correctly internalizing (m = 1) the costs of the potential …re sales associated with debt. This is what we show in the next proposition:
h ; f l ; p is Pareto optimum if and only if whoever makes the leverage, e¤ort and …re sales decisions internalizes the price function (4). That is, when m = 1.
The intuition is that, in our model, the First Welfare Theorem fails because the CEO does not use the right price function (4). Optimism distorts the information content of prices, inducing the CEO to choose excessive debt and …re sales. Fire sales entail a real cost for society because v > 0 is not a mere wealth transfer. A social planner could improve social welfare by reducing debt and the waste of resources in the low state of nature. The planner could then redistribute the gains from the Pareto e¢cient output to ensure everybody is better o¤.
CEO's choices
The following proposition characterizes the solution to the CEO's problem.
Proposition 2 For variable payments > 0, both debt and …re sales in the low state increase with e¤ort p and with CEO's optimism (lower m means more optimism). That is,
The levels of debt and …re sales are:
E¤ort, p( ; m), is implicitly de…ned by the incentive compatibility constraint,
E¤ort increases with variable payments, , and decreases with m. Moreover,
When e¤ort is endogenous, the total e¤ect of optimism (m) on borrowing, @d @m , works through two channels that can be decomposed as follows:
We denote by @d @m jp the e¤ect of m on d holding e¤ort constant. This is the direct channel well known in models of managerial optimism: for a given …xed e¤ort, higher optimism (smaller m) leads to a larger overestimation of the revenues from …re sales and, ultimately, more debt.
When e¤ort p is endogenous there is a second, indirect channel in (15). Through this new channel, endogenous e¤ort reinforces overborrowing because there is a complementarity between e¤ort and leverage, @d @p > 0. Leverage is more pro…table when e¤ort is higher since more e¤ort makes the high state of nature more likely. Moreover, e¤ort is higher when the CEO overestimates the revenues from …re sales, @p @m < 0: Therefore, CEO's optimism makes overborrowing larger when e¤ort is endogenous than when it is exogenous, that is,
Result (14) says that more optimistic managers are more sensitive to compensation incentives. Hence, the e¤ects of optimism on e¤ort @p @m < 0 ; and thus the importance of the indirect channel in (15), are larger the higher the variable payment.
We denote as p and f l the e¢cient choices of e¤ort and …re sales corresponding to m = 1. An optimistic CEO (m < 1) exerts an e¤ort higher than the e¢cient level of e¤ort,
and overborrows:
In the low state, the …re sales expected by the optimistic CEO are larger than the e¢cient level of …re sales:
but lower than the actual …re salesf l needed to avoid bankruptcy in the low state:
The social ine¢ciency arises because the optimistic CEO expects that, in the low state of nature, she will sell f l units at price q l m given by (5). Accordingly, she borrows d in (11). However, …re sales will take place at price q l given by (4). Since the …re sale price is lower than expected by the CEO she ends up selling too many core assets (f l ) to avoid default which depresses …re sales prices even further.
Equilibrium Contract
The next proposition characterizes the contract selected by the shareholder. The CEO wants to be compensated up to her reservation salary: Optimism makes her underestimate the costs from asset sales, overestimate …rm's pro…ts and thus accept a lower share of them as compensation
Proposition 3 For a given m 1, the shareholder o¤ers a contract with no …xed salary (F = 0) and a percentage of the …rm's pro…t ( < 1) which is smaller the larger the CEO's optimism (m smaller):
The CEO's participation constraint is binding at her reservation compensation, A.
In the next proposition we show that the shareholder, even if he is rational, has no incentive to correct the CEO's ine¢cient overleverage.
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Proposition 4 The shareholder's expected pro…t at t 1 net of the executive compensation, is V (p; m) c(p) A: The variation of this net pro…t with respect to the CEO's optimism can be written as 
represents the optimistic CEO's overestimation of the …rm's pro…t at t 1 ,
Proposition 4 shows that the shareholder proposes a compensation package that optimizes his return but is socially ine¢cient. Equation (20) decomposes the result into three components.
The …rst component in the right hand side of (20) is what we call social cost of optimism. For a given level of e¤ort, optimism (m < 1) results into overleverage (Proposition 2) and, in 7 By rational we mean that the shareholder is aware that …re sales prices are actually determined by (4) and not by (5).
the case of the low state, excessive …re sales. This erodes the …rm's pro…ts and the shareholder's net payo¤; that is,
The second component in the right hand side of (20) is what we call the wealth transfer from the CEO to the shareholder, . An optimistic CEO, because she overestimates the …rm's pro…ts, "saves" shareholders part of her compensation. We refer to this as a wealth transfer to the shareholder.
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Notice that this component and the …rst component would arise even if e¤ort were exogenous.
The third and last component in the right hand side of (20) is what we call the enhanced e¤ort channel. Optimism encourages the CEO to leverage more and provide more e¤ort (Proposition 2). This is valuable to the shareholder because higher e¤ort reduces the probability of the low state of nature. This component arises only when e¤ort is endogenously determined.
The …rst component of (20) induces the shareholder to correct the CEO. However, the second and third components show that, because of the unpaid extra e¤ort that optimistic CEOs provide, the shareholder is better o¤ by letting the CEO overleverage.
Regulation
In the previous section we showed that when CEOs are optimistic, the unregulated market equilibrium is ine¢cient. The CEO overborrows and the shareholder, even if he is not optimistic, has no incentive to correct the CEO. In this section we analyze two tools to induce social e¢ciency. First, we restrict shareholders' choices on the structure (although not the level) of executive compensation. That is, we impose a cap on the variable relative to the …xed salary. Second, we directly regulate the leverage level, like with standard capital requirements or the leverage restrictions discussed by Korinek and Jeanne (2014) . Finally, we compare the two policy tools.
Regulating executive compensation
The regulator imposes a cap T on the ratio of variable-to-…xed CEO's compensation,
The shareholder is constrained by the cap when he designs the CEO's compensation and alters the compensation contract:
8 At t 0 , the CEO based her decisions on the price function (5) and agreed to work in exchange for her reservation compensation plus her e¤ort cost. However, if the low state arrives, it is the price function (4) that governs asset prices. Asset prices are lower than expected by the optimistic CEO, thus the actual …re sales will be larger than expected f l > f l and pro…ts and payments to the CEO are smaller. The CEO is ultimately paid less than her reservation utility.
Proposition 5 The shareholder proposes a contract in which the cap constraint (23) is binding. The variable payments increase as the cap is relaxed,
The …xed salary is
E¤ort is a function of via (13) : As the cap becomes tighter (smaller T ), the variable share decreases and the CEO has less incentive to provide e¤ort ( @p T @T > 0). Lower e¤ort leads to lower leverage and fewer …re sales in the low state of nature.
It is important to stress that there is a tradeo¤ between achieving the socially e¢cient level of debt, d , de…ned in (17) and the e¢cient amount of e¤ort, p , de…ned in (16) : For any m < 1, achieving d implies an e¤ort provision lower than the socially e¢cient level p . On the other side, inducing p implies ine¢cient overleverage d T > d . This tradeo¤ exists because the cap T reduces variable payments and this discourages the executive from providing e¤ort. The …gure plots in the x-axis di¤erent levels of the cap T . In the y-axis, the top panel plots the CEO's debt choice while the bottom panel plots her e¤ort level. Both panels include the e¢cient levels of debt and e¤ort (d and p , respectively).
[Insert Figure 1 around here] Figure 1 shows that as the cap is tighter (T smaller) the regulator prevents the shareholder from providing too much variable pay. As a consequence the CEO exerts less e¤ort and borrows less. The complementarity between e¤ort and leverage implies that as debt moves towards the optimal d in the top panel then e¤ort becomes smaller than the e¢cient level p in the bottom panel. In other words, to lower leverage regulators need to lower the share of variable pay, which ultimately disincentives e¤ort provision.
Alternatively, if the regulator is targeting a socially e¢cient provision of e¤ort p in the bottom panel, the top panel shows that the corresponding cap on variable compensation leads the CEO to overleverage relative to the e¢cient level of debt d .
Regulating leverage
We assume in this section that the CEO solves the problem (7) subject to the same restrictions plus an additional restriction on debt imposed by the regulators. 
in the state s = l. E¤ort p( ; d; m) is implicitly de…ned by the incentive compatibility constraint,
where V (p; d; m) is the expected pro…t function:
The optimal contract implies F d = 0 and a share d of pro…ts such that the participation constraint is binding:
Constraints (27) and (28) 
Comparing regulations
A natural question is whether, from the point of view of the regulator, any of the two tools (a cap on variable pay or a cap on debt) is preferable. The following proposition shows that a cap on debt is a better policy tool because it can achieve the socially e¢cient level of debt with a higher provision of e¤ort.
Proposition 6 Given a cap on the variable compensation T that yields the socially e¢cient level of debt d , the CEO's optimal provision of e¤ort, p T , is lower than the e¤ort p d exerted by the same CEO when the cap on variable compensation is replaced with a cap d = d on debt. Moreover, the variable compensation in the later case, d is higher than the variable compensation in the former, T .
Both policy tools can achieve the optimal level of debt. However, the cap on variable pay leads to a higher distortion in the provision of e¤ort. It imposes a …xed salary higher than what shareholders would choose if they were free to select the compensation contract that delivers the socially optimal level of debt. Since higher …xed salary discourages e¤ort, the cap on variable compensation makes the low state of nature (a crisis) more likely than the cap on leverage.
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[Insert Figure 3 around here] Figure 3 con…rms our previous result. When caps are set such that both policy tools induce the socially optimal debt level d , the cap on debt (dotted line, right scale) induces higher e¤ort and variable compensation than the cap on compensation (dashed line, left scale). In other words, if the level of debt measures the size of a crisis, then both tools ensure crises of the same size. However, regulating compensation makes crises more likely.
It is worth discussing now the generality of Proposition 6 in the light of the simplifying assumptions that we have made to render the model more tractable. Restrictions (3) and (6) prevent the …rm to enter in losses at t 1 in the low state. As a consequence, the limited-liability restriction will never be binding. Removing these restrictions and allowing …rm losses may result in an optimal contract with positive …xed payments (F > 0) necessary to meet the limited-liability constraint. This may be the case even when there exists a cap on debt. The assumption of risk-neutrality implies that the CEO needs not be compensated for the extra risk she assumes when she is induced to expend costly e¤ort by the shareholder. This is captured by the incentive compatibility constraint (13) or, alternatively, the constraint (27) if debt is restricted. If the CEO is risk-averse, a risk-premium must be paid. This will likely imply a positive …xed payment necessary to meet the CEO's (binding) participation constraint. Hence, removing our simplifying assumptions will likely result in a positive …xed payment when debt is restricted.
Heuristically, the intuition in Proposition 6 should hold as long as the …xed payment necessary to attain the socially optimal leverage (F T ) when the variable bonus is capped is higher than the shareholder's optimal …xed salary under the leverage cap (F d ). Theoretically, this will depend, among other things, on the CEO's risk-aversion, her disutility of e¤ort and her reservation salary.
Empirical predictions
The model generates a number of empirical predictions involving …rm leverage (de…ned as assets to equity), executive's e¤ort and compensation. We outline the predictions below.
First, optimism is positively associated with leverage and e¤ort, and this e¤ect is larger 13 Proposition 6 shows that the leverage restriction is better than the cap on variable compensation because it achieves the optimal debt level d and gets closer to the optimal e¤ort level. This does not necessarily mean that the planner would choose that leverage restriction, because the planner would optimize over the entire (d; p) space.
in sectors (…rms) in which the executive's e¤ort plays a relevant role in the success of any investment. This includes, for example, sectors in which executives' soft skills and information acquisition are key for the investment success. Among these sectors (…rms), those with higher leverage should have their executives exerting higher e¤ort @d @p > 0 : There has been some work on the …rst part of the prediction, but not on the other components. For example, BenDavid et al. (2013) …nd some evidence that …rms with optimistic executives invest more and have more debt. Malmendier et al. (2011) …nd that optimistic managers use leverage more aggressively. The long hours usually associated with the …nancial industry may be anecdotal evidence for the complementarity between e¤ort and leverage.
Second, Otto (2014) …nds that …rms pro…t from the overcon…dence of CEOs who overestimate the future value of the …rm's equity by granting fewer stock options and lower bonuses. Our theory adds a cross-sectional dimension: shareholders will take advantage of this feature especially in sectors in which e¤ort is less observable and leverage is higher, like the …nancial industry. In these two cases Proposition 4 shows that the gains for shareholders from the unpaid enhanced e¤ort are larger.
Third, there is a growing empirical literature showing that asset booms and leverage are positively correlated (see for example, Jorda et al. 2013 ). If we assume that optimism is more likely in periods of asset booms then our model predicts that episodes of rapid increases in corporate leverage (like the recent experiences of emerging markets) are associated with increases in the variable share of compensation. This is because optimistic executives overvalue the variable pay and shareholders may have no incentives to undo this bias as we showed in Proposition 4. Moreover, our theory would predict that if some countries favor variable compensation more than others (for example, di¤erent …scal treatments) the elasticity of leverage growth to asset price growth would be larger. This may be of interest for cross-country studies linking leverage and asset prices, like Giacomini et al. (2014) . Finally, our model predicts that say-on-pay regulation will not help in mitigating leverage in periods of asset booms and optimism. In fact, say-on-pay can reinforce overborrowing if shareholders design contracts to pro…t from optimistic CEOs. This may lead to testable predictions comparing countries with di¤erent say-on-pay regimes. Similarly, proposition 6 suggests that imposing a cap on variable compensation distorts e¤ort more than regulating leverage. Empirical work could analyze whether di¤erent regulations of executive compensation alter the frequency of …rms' …re-sales or defaults across countries.
Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed a model with endogenous determination of leverage, executive compensation and CEO's e¤ort. Overborrowing arises due to CEO's optimism. Our insights come from making the CEO's e¤ort endogenous and non-contractible.
Our results show that when executives are optimistic about asset prices in states of distress, shareholders propose compensation packages that lead to socially excessive leverage. This result provides support for regulation and suggests that say-on-pay regimes may induce greater leverage. This result may motivate further empirical work because Correa and Lel (2016) show that say-on-pay laws have lead to substantial changes in executive compensation.
We …nd that, at least for risk-neutral agents, the optimal regulation is not the regulation of executive compensation. A cap on debt is socially more e¢cient: it can restore the e¢cient level of debt with a lower distortion in managerial e¤ort. In any case, decreasing leverage reduces the losses of …nancial distress, but simultaneously weakens the incentives (i.e. e¤ort) necessary to make crises less likely.
The proof is similar to showing that the First Welfare Theorem fails when one agent uses distorted prices. Optimism is distorting the prices used by the CEO. To trace the Pareto Frontier of e¢cient allocations, we solve the problem of a planner who chooses the e¢cient allocation of production among the set of feasible allocations and then redistributes the output among the agents using lump-sum taxes or transfers T s ;T s in zero net supply.
By de…nition, the payments to the shareholder and to the CEO must add up to …rm's pro…ts. We can de…ne the …rm's expected pro…t net of transfers and e¤ort cost as
The expected pro…t of the unskilled investor net of transfers is de…ned as
The transfers must be in zero net supply:
De…nition 1 The set of feasible allocations is the set F = d; f h ; f l ; p such that the following equations hold: (2), (3), d > 0, and market clearing in asset sales.
De…nition 2 P F denotes the set of Pareto allocations. That is, for all allocations x = d; f h ; f l ; p 2 P there is no other allocation x 0 2 F for which there exists a system of transfers n T
with at least one the previous inequalities being strict inequality.
The planner problem traces the Pareto Frontier when maximizing a weighted sum of the expected pro…ts of …rms and unskilled investors among the allocations in the feasibility set F: Denoting the social weight of the unskilled investor as 1 0 , the social planner solves for
subject to d; f h ; f l ; p 2 F and to the zero-net supply transfers (A3).
The set of FOCs from problem (A4) includes the price function (4). Thus, any allocation decided by the CEO using (5) with m < 1 leads to a suboptimal level of …re sales, and to lower output because the costs paid by the unskilled investor are wasted resources. Those allocations cannot be Pareto e¢cient because, for any weight ; the planner could always choose an allocation solving her problem (thus using the price function (4)). The planner's allocation will have higher total output by de…nition of the Pareto frontier. Then the planner can redistribute the higher output to make everybody better o¤. In other words, the First Welfare Theorem applies to our economy when the agents use the right prices.
Thus, we can write (A8) as follows:
The left-hand-side of (A10) is the derivative of the CEO's variable payments relative to her e¤ort, that we denote by
. A su¢cient condition for the solution to the CEO's problem to be a local maximum is that the Lagrangian function evaluated at the optimal is negative semide…nite. This condition requires all the …rst principal minors of the Hessian matrix for the Lagrangian function to be non-positive. We assume that the inequality is strict:
By the Implicit Function Theorem, taking the derivative of (A10) with respect to m and solving 
Proof of Proposition 3
The shareholder proposes a contract (F; ) that maximizes her revenue,
The non-negative multipliers are 1 to 5 . The following slackness conditions must hold: 2 (F + V (p; m) c(p) A) = 0; 3 = 0; 4 (1 ) = 0; 5 F = 0: The FOCs are:
We can show that it is optimal for the shareholder to propose F = 0 and < 1. First, by contradiction we prove that F > 0 and 0 < < 1 cannot be a solution. Assume F > 0 and 0 < < 1. Then 3 = 4 = 5 = 0 by the slackness conditions, and 2 = 1 by (A13). Then, given (A14),
(1 ) = 0; which can only be true for = 1. We show now that F = 0 and 0 < < 1 is a solution. If we assume so, then, by the slackness conditions, 3 = 4 = 0. From (A13) and (A14),
(1 ) = 5 V (p; m), which holds if and only if 5 > 0. This is consistent with F = 0. Finally, given (A9), (1 )V (p; m) > 0 for any < 1. This rules out F 0 and = 1 as a solution. Therefore, at the optimal, F = 0 and 0 < < 1.
The participation constraint is binding:
Given the incentive compatibility constraint (13), it is suboptimal to pay the CEO any compensation above her reservation utility net of the cost of e¤ort. It would not increase the CEO's e¤ort and it would decrease the shareholder's net pro…t. The optimal variable payment and e¤ort p are jointly determined by the incentive and by the participation constraints.
Taking the total derivative of V (p; m) c(p) A = 0 with respect to m and using the incentive compatibility constraint (13), it follows that
The inequality follows from V (p; m) being positive and decreasing in m.
Substituting (A17) into V (p; m); we obtain equation (21). The inequality (20) follows after replacing (21) and (22) into (A16).
Taking the derivative of (21) with respect to m we obtain
This expression is strictly positive for all m < 1 if and only if
This is equivalent to
< 1, which follows from parameter restriction (2). Moreover,
Proof of Proposition 5
The shareholder solves the same problem as in (A12) but replacing the non negativity constraint on F with the condition T F V (p; m). The Lagrangian is de…ned as before. The last slackness condition becomes 5 (T F V (p; m)) = 0: The FOCs with respect to F and are:
As it was shown in the proof of Proposition 3, T > 0 and 3 = 0. By contradiction, we show now that T < 1. Assume T = 1. Then (A19) implies that
, a necessary condition for this equality is 5 < 2 1 < 0. This contradicts the non-negativity condition on the multipliers. Hence, T < 1 and, by the corresponding slack condition, 4 = 0.
We prove by contradiction that 5 > 0. Assume 5 = 0. By (A18), 2 = 1. Replacing these values in (A19) the FOC becomes @V (p;m) @p @p @
(1 ) = 4 . Since T < 1 the FOC implies 4 > 0 which contradicts the slackness condition. Hence, 5 > 0: This implies:
Assume 2 > 0. Then (24) follows from replacing (A20) in the binding participation constraint. Replacing (24) in the binding slackness condition (A20), the optimal must satisfy:
From (A21),
> 0: Hence, the optimal variable payment incentive increases as the cap constraint on the variable variable payment is relaxed.
Proof of Proposition 6
We de…ne the cap on variable compensation T such that the CEO chooses an amount of debt equal to d . In other words, comparing (11) and (17), p T is such that
To induce e¤ort p T , T is chosen such that the incentive compatibility constraint (13) and the slack condition (A21) are jointly satis…ed. This, together with (24), yields the optimal contract (F T ; T ).
Alternatively, we impose a cap d = d on the CEO's debt such that she chooses precisely an amount of debt d . The shareholder's optimal contract and the level of e¤ort chosen by the CEO must jointly satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint (27) and the participation constraint (28).
We show …rst that p T is suboptimal for the CEO in this case. By de…nition, Finally, we show that, to obtain the socially e¢cient level of debt, the optimal contract with a cap on debt must include a larger variable compensation to induce a larger amount of e¤ort. Let us solve for c 0 (p) in (27) and replace it in (28). We can then express the participation constraint as a function of the CEO's e¤ort as follows: 
